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ABSTRACT (150 words) 25 
 26 
Anticipating meaningful actions in the environment is an essential function of the brain. Such predictive 27 
mechanisms originate from the motor system and allow for inferring actions from environmental 28 
affordances, the potential to act within a specific environment. Using architecture, we provide a unique 29 
perspective to the abiding debate in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy on whether cognition depends on 30 
movement or is decoupled from our physical structure. To investigate cognitive processes associated with 31 
architectural affordances, we used a Mobile Brain/Body Imaging approach recording brain activity 32 
synchronized to head-mounted virtual reality. Participants perceived and acted upon virtual transitions 33 
ranging from non-passable to easily passable. We demonstrate that early sensory brain activity, upon 34 
revealing the environment and before actual movement, differed as a function of affordances. Additionally, 35 
movement through transitions was preceded by a motor-related negative component also depended on 36 




SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT (118 words) 41 
 42 
By using electroencephalography and virtual reality, our research provide a unique perspective to the 43 
centurial open-ended debate in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy on the relation between cognition, 44 
movement and environment. Our results indicate that cortical potentials vary as a function of bodily 45 
affordances reflected by the physical environment. Firstly, the results of this study implies that cognition is 46 
inherently related to potential movement of the body, thus we advance that action is interrelated with 47 
perception, actively influencing the perceivable environment. Secondly, as cortical potentials are influenced 48 
by the potential to move, which in turn is the task of architectural design, architects holds largely a privilege 49 
of human health, and thus potentially capable of provoking and preventing physiological conditions. 50 
 51 
 52 
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INTRODUCTION. The affordance of a given spatial environment, defined as the perception of possibilit ies 54 
for, or restraints on, action that the environment offers, is essential for an agent to produce meaningful 55 
behavior. Thus, the affordances of the spatial environment becomes a central concept for humans interacting 56 
with their world. The term affordances was first introduced by Gibson (1), and later specified by various 57 
authors including Clark who defines affordance as “[…] the possibilities for use, intervention and action which 58 
the physical world offers a given agent and are determined by the ‘fit’ between the agent’s physical structure, 59 
capacities and skills and the action-related properties of the environment itself.” (2). In light of emerging 60 
theories of embodied cognition, the perception of the environment may be dependent on proprioceptive 61 
mechanisms. According to predictive processing, a neuroscientifically based theory of embodied cognition (3–62 
5), motor systems, similar to perceptual processes, aim at cancelling out continuously incoming bottom-up 63 
sensory signals with top-down predictions. In this perspective, movement emerges as a result of an active 64 
inference that attempts to either minimizing motor trajectory prediction errors by acting, and thus perceiving 65 
the unfolding of the predicted movement, or by changing perception itself (6–8). From the standpoint of active 66 
inference, motor systems suppress errors through a dynamic interchange of prediction and action. In other 67 
words, there are two ways to minimizing prediction errors; one is to adjust predictions to fit the current sensory 68 
input, while another is to adapt the unfolding of movement to make predictions come true. It is a unifying 69 
perspective on perception and action suggesting that action is both perceived and caused by perception (9). 70 
Hence, action, perception, and cognition coordinate to move the body in ways that conform a transitional set 71 
of expectations (10). The claim we seek to investigate in the present study is that perception is rooted in action, 72 
creating an action-perception loop, informed by dynamically (top-down/bottom-up) generated prediction 73 
errors. Ultimately, the argument is that perception is not the sole result of sensing the physical world, but 74 
unfolds as an ongoing interaction between sensory processes and bodily actions. Such a claim has 75 
philosophical and neuroscientific significance as the neural dynamics underlying perception would be 76 
intimately dependent on the affordances of a given environment.  77 
 78 
To further investigate this claim, we used electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings to address the neural 79 
dynamics of action-perception interactions through affordance manipulations in architectural experiences. 80 
More specifically, we investigated the affordances of transitions as they form an ideal candidate due to their 81 
dynamic nature concerning the duration of altering one condition to another (11). We here confine transitions 82 
to the passage between spaces which, according to the enactivists’ proposed action-perception loop, will be 83 
experience dependent on the affordances offered by the passage itself. From an architecturally historical point 84 
of view, the use of transitions have evidently been exploited at least since eleventh-thirteenth dynasties (e.g., 85 
Fazio et al., 2008, chaps. 1, 2, 5). Written interest in human experience of architectural settings has been 86 
established at least for the last two millennia (e.g., Norberg-Schulz, 1965; Palladio, 1997; Pallasmaa, 2011; 87 
Rasmussen, 1959; Vitruvius and Morgan, 1960). Despite transitions being ubiquitous in architecture, the 88 
underlying mechanisms of how transitions affect human perceivers appears to have taken an implicit, 89 
overlooked, and close to nonexistent position in architectural discourse, with few exceptions (15, 18–20). Due 90 
to the dynamic nature of architecture, an essential part of transitions and experiencing architecture is that of 91 
being able to act (21). Traditionally, investigations of architectural experiences are phenomenological – the 92 
description of phenomena in how experience gives access to a world of space and time (14, 22–24). Such 93 
descriptions find specifically movement of the individual to be an expression of a holistic experience of 94 
architecture (14, 22), linking the nature of movement to architectural experiences (25). Transitions in 95 
architecture depend on voluntary movement and thus a prerequisite for any transit is a goal, which in turn calls 96 
for action planning. Coarsely three parameters compose a transition: a motivated goal, a change in physical 97 
environment and the unfolding of action. All three parameters are interdependent, as reaching a goal depends 98 
on the affordance offered by an environment, and also propels the body in space contributing to experience. 99 
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Architectural transitions thus include the attenuation of an agent’s experience through movements and how 100 
such movements animate the body through environmental changes. 101 
 102 
Data from neuroscientific experiments addressing this issue might contribute to discussions centered on 103 
philosophical questions on how we relate to the world. For long, enactivists have implicated the reciprocal 104 
dependency of the living organism, as a self-organized living system, and the embedded body in a world for 105 
cognition (26–28). Enactivism is rooted in phenomenology (21, 29), similar to prominent architectural 106 
theorists, who put body, action, and cognition central to experience. Active inference closely relates to 107 
enactivism, in the sense that we act to perceive, and vice versa. Such a thesis rests on a hierarchical and 108 
dynamic model of the world, which temporally dissociates lower sensorimotor inferences from higher 109 
motivated goals, as fast and slow, respectively (30). Fast, lower sensorimotor inferences depict processes of 110 
affordances, which thereby must be present in early stages of perception. Hierarchical affordance competition 111 
(HAC; Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016) takes the temporal aspect of affordances much further, by suggesting that 112 
cortical activity relates to the immediate decision of action selection, which occurs fluently during movement. 113 
Such an account of temporally extended affordance is in accordance with active inferences. 114 
 115 
To investigate the impact of environmental affordances on early sensory processing in actively transiting 116 
humans, we used a Mobile Brain/Body Imaging approach (32–34) recording brain activity with EEG 117 
synchronized to movement recordings and head mounted virtual reality (VR). This approach allows for 118 
investigating brain dynamics of participants perceiving an environment and the transitions contained therein 119 
as well as brain dynamics during the transitions itself. Previous studies investigating event-related potential 120 
(ERP) activity in stationary participants demonstrated slow cortical potentials to indicate anticipative motor 121 
behavior (for an overview, see Luck and Kappenman, 2011, chap. 8). Known motor-related cortical 122 
components (MRCPs) are the readiness potential (RP; Kornhuber and Deecke, 2016), contingent negative 123 
variation (CNV), and the stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN; Brunia, 2003), which can be seen as indicators 124 
of predictive behavior (38). MRCPs are negative going waveforms preceding an actual, or imagined, motor 125 
execution. However, these negative components are associated with multiple processes including sensory, 126 
cognitive, and motor systems. In a study by Bozzacchi et al. (39), the authors attempted to measure affordances 127 
of a physical object by evaluating whether the anticipated consequence of action itself influence the brain 128 
activity preceding a self-paced action. The authors compared MRCPs of situations where it was possible to 129 
reach out and grasp a cup, versus situations where it was impossible to grasp the cup, by tying the hands of the 130 
participants. A motor execution was forced at all times. In situations where it was impossible to grasp the cup, 131 
the authors reported an absence of early activity over the parietal cortex, and found instead increased activity 132 
over the prefrontal cortex. The results were interpreted as reflecting an awareness of the inability to execute a 133 
goal-oriented action. Closely related to the MRCPs is the post-imperative negative variation (PINV), a negative 134 
going waveform that is present succeeding an imperative stimulus. It reflects the immediate motor execution 135 
related to the onset of an imperative stimulus and was observed during experiments investigating learned 136 
helplessness or loss of control (40, 41). The PINV thus allows linking of motor related potentials to anticipation 137 
of affective states (42). 138 
 139 
If an enactive account of perception, action and cognition is correct, affordances intimately relate to higher 140 
hierarchical levels through low-level perceptual cues. Such an account would situate processing of affordances 141 
at a similar stage as early perceptual processes and should reveal differences in sensory and motor-related 142 
ERPs associated with the perceived affordance of an environment. To investigate whether brain activity is 143 
altered depending on affordances offered by the environment, we presented human observers with 144 
environmental stimuli that allowed or prohibited a transition from one room to the next. To this end, 145 
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participants were presented with a view into a room containing one door of different widths, allowing or 146 
prohibiting a transition into the next room and thus providing different affordances. We expected to find 147 
differences in cortical responses to co-vary as a function of affordances over sensory and motor areas. In 148 
addition, we expected differences in motor-related cortical potentials as a function of the environmental 149 
affordances when participants were instructed to walk through the door or to remain in the same room.  150 
 151 
METHODS 152 
Participants. 20 participants (9 female) without history of neurological pathologies were recruited from a 153 
participant pool of the Technical University of Berlin, Berlin. All participants read and signed a written 154 
informed consent about the experimental protocol, which was approved by the local ethics committee. 155 
Participants received either monetary compensation (10€/hour) or accredited course hours. The mean age 156 
was 28.1 years (σ = 6.2), all participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and none had a specific 157 
background in architecture (no architects or architectural students). One participant was excluded due to 158 
technical issues of the experimental setup.  159 
 160 
Paradigm description. The experiment took place in the Berlin Mobile Brain/Body Imaging Laboratories 161 
(BeMoBIL) with one of the experimental rooms providing a space of 160 m2. The size of the virtual space 162 
was 9 x 5 meters with a room size of 4.5 x 5 meters for the first room and a room size of 4.5 x 5 meters for 163 
the second room. Participants performed a forewarned (S1-S2) Go/NoGo paradigm (pseudo-randomized 164 
50/50) in the virtual reality environment that required them to walk from one room to a second room. Doors 165 
of different width ranging from unpassable (20 cm, Narrow) to passable (100 cm, Mid) to easily passible 166 
(1500 cm, Wide) manipulated the transition affordance between rooms. The experiment consisted of a 3 x 2 167 
repeated measures design including the factors door width (Narrow, Mid, Wide; pseudo-randomized) and 168 
movement instruction (Go, NoGo). A total of 240 trials per participant was collected with 40 trials for each 169 
of the factor levels. One trial consisted of a participant starting in a dark environment on a predefined starting 170 
square (see Figure 1). The “lights” would go on after a random inter-trial-interval (mean = 3 s, σ = 1 s), and 171 
participants faced a room with a closed door. They were instructed to wait (mean = 6 s, σ = 1 s) for a color 172 
change of the door with a change to green indicating a Go trial and a change to red indicating a NoGo trial. 173 
In case of a green door, the participant walked towards the door, which would slide aside. Upon entering the 174 
subsequent space, participants were instructed to find and virtually touch a red rotating circle by using the 175 
controller. The circle would inform the participant to have earned another 0.1€ to their basic reimbursement 176 
of 10 Euro per hour. After each trial, participants had to give an emotional rating for the environment 177 
irrespective of whether they transitioned through the door (Go condition) or whether they remained in the 178 
same room (NoGo condition) without transition. To this end, participants were instructed to go back to the 179 
starting square, and fill in a virtual Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) questionnaire, using a laser pointer 180 
from the controller, and to subsequently pulling the response button located at the pointer finger to turn the 181 
“lights off”. The lights would go back on automatically to start the next trial.  182 
 183 
In Go-trials, participants were instructed to walk towards the door and into the second room even in case the 184 
door was too narrow to pass. This was done to control for motor execution in the Go-condition and to allow 185 
movement towards the goal irrespective of the affordance (passable vs. unpassable). Upon touching the 186 
surrounding walls, the walls would turn red and inform the participants they have failed to pass, and thus must 187 
return to the start square, fill in the virtual SAM and start the next trial by pulling the trigger. Participants 188 
would quickly notice that the narrow door (20 cm) was impossible to pass without producing the warning 189 
feedback that they have failed to pass. All participants had a training phase to get accustomed to the VR 190 
environment and the different conditions. The experimenter observed the participants from a control room, 191 
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separated from the experimental space, using two cameras and a mirrored display of the virtual environment 192 
to reduce interactions to a minimum during the experiments.  193 
 194 
Figure 1 about here 195 
 196 
Subjective and Behavioral data. To investigate the subjective experience of the transitions, we introduced 197 
the participants with a virtual Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) questionnaire after each trial. The SAM is a 198 
pictorial assessment of pleasure, arousal and dominance on a 5-point Likert scale (43). The manikin display 199 
ranges from smiling to frowning (pleasure), from a dot in the stomach to an explosion (arousal) and from 200 
being very small to very big (dominance). Participants were asked to self-assess their current state after each 201 
trial. Furthermore, we measured the reaction time from the onset of the Go-stimulus (door color change) to 202 
reaching the opening-threshold itself, to assess the behavior. The data was analyzed using ANOVA with the 203 
width of the doors as repeated measures factor. In case of violation of normality and homogeneity, corrected 204 
p-values are reported. For post-hoc analysis, the data was contrasted using Tukey HSD. 205 
 206 
EEG Recording and data analysis. To investigate the impact of transitional affordances on human 207 
cognition and brain dynamics, we used a MoBI approach (32–34, 44) recording human brain dynamics in 208 
participants actively transitioning through virtual rooms. All data streams were recorded and synchronized 209 
using LabStreamingLayer (LSL; Kothe, 2014). Participants wore a backpack, which held a high-performance 210 
gaming computer to render the VR environment (Zotac, PC Partner Limited, Hong Kong, China) attached to 211 
two batteries and an EEG amplifier system. We combined a Windows Mixed Reality (WMR; 2.89”, 2880 x 212 
1440 resolution, update rate at 90 Hz, 100 degree field of view with a weight of 440 grams, linked to the 213 
Zotac computer through HDMI) headset and one controller by ACER to display and interact with the virtual 214 
environment based on Unity (see Figure 2). Events for recordings of performance and physiological data 215 
were triggered by the position of the participant in the tracking space or by the respective response buttons of 216 
the remote control. Specific events, such as touching the wall, all button presses, transitioning through the 217 
door, answering the questionnaire and all cases of “lights on” (and off), were synchronized with the recorded 218 
brain activity and the presented VR environment through LSL. 219 
 220 
Figure 2 about here 221 
 222 
EEG data was acquired continuously with a 64 channels EEG system (eegoSports, ANT Neuro, Enschede, 223 
Netherlands), sampled with 500 Hz. Impedances were kept below 10 kOhm. The computational delay 224 
generated by the interaction of ANT Neuro software, Windows Mixed Reality and Unity was measured to be 225 
20 ms (σ = 4), which was taken into account during the analysis by subtracting the average delay from each 226 
event latency. With a jitter of 4 ms, we considered the delay to have little to no impact on the ERPs. Offline 227 
analysis were conducted using MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) and the EEGLAB toolbox (46). 228 
The raw data were band-pass filtered between 1 Hz and 100 Hz and down-sampled to 250 Hz. Channels with 229 
more than five standard deviations from the joint probability of the recorded electrodes were removed and 230 
subsequently interpolated. The datasets were then re-referenced to an average reference and adaptive mixture 231 
independent component analysis (AMICA; Palmer et al., 2011) was computed on the remaining rank of the 232 
data using one model with online artifact rejection in five iterations. The resultant ICA spheres and weights 233 
matrices were transferred to the raw dataset that was preprocessed using the identical preprocessing parameters 234 
like the ICA dataset, except the filtering, which used a band-pass filter from 0.2 Hz to 40 Hz. Subsequently, 235 
independent components (ICs) reflecting eye movements (blinks and horizontal movements) were removed 236 
manually based on their topography, their spectrum, and their temporal characteristics.  237 
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Epochs were created time-locked to the onset of the room including the closed door (“Lights on”) from -500 239 
ms before to 1500 ms after stimulus onset for Narrow, Mid and Wide door trials. Similarly, another set of 240 
epochs were time-locked to the second stimulus Go/NoGo from -500 ms before to 1000 ms after onset of the 241 
stimulus for Narrow, Mid and Wide door trials. On average, 15% (σ = 10.8) of all epochs were automatically 242 
rejected when they deviated more than five standard deviations from the joint probability and distribution of 243 
the activity of all recorded electrodes.  244 
 245 
The visual-evoked potentials as well as MRCPs were analyzed at central midline electrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, 246 
POz and Oz) covering all relevant locations including the visual and the motor cortex as reported in previous 247 
studies (39, 48). As stimuli were distributed across the complete visual field and participants walked through 248 
the virtual spaces, we did not expect any lateralization of ERPs. All channels were analyzed, however only 249 
three channels (FCz, Pz and Oz) are reported and discussed in-text according to reported results by Bozzacchi 250 
et al. (39). The analysis results of all six channels can be found in the supplementary material. For peak analysis 251 
of the P1-N1 complex, the grand average peaks were estimated and individual peaks were defined as the 252 
maximum positive and negative peak in the time window surrounding the grand average P1 and N1 peak (+/- 253 
10 ms from peak), respectively. An automatic peak detection algorithm detected the peaks in the averaged 254 
epochs for each participant. Multiple peaks were detected and systematically weighed depending on the 255 
magnitude, the distance to the grand-average peak latency that was determined by visual inspection of grand 256 
average ERP, and the polarity (please see algorithm in the supplementary material). For anterior N1 and 257 
posterior P1, by visual inspection of the grand average ERPs, the grand-average latency was estimated to be 258 
140 ms with a search window for individual peaks ranging from 50 – 200 ms. For the anterior P1 and posterior 259 
N1 the grand-average peak latency was estimated to 215 ms with a search window for individual peaks ranging 260 
from 140 – 290 ms. 261 
 262 
Mean peak amplitudes were analyzed using a 3 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA using the door width (Narrow, 263 
Mid, Wide) and electrode as repeated measures. The results descriptions focus on the visual evoked P1 264 
component at posterior electrodes (Pz, POz and Oz) and the N1 component at frontal leads (Fz, FCz and Cz) 265 
based on separate ANOVAs. For the N2 and P2 component at posterior electrodes (Pz, POz and Oz) and frontal 266 
leads (Fz, FCz and Cz), separate ANOVAs were computed in the time-range of 140 – 290 ms. For the later 267 
motor related potentials, an ANOVA was computed for the mean amplitude in the time-range from 600 to 800 268 
ms. The data was analyzed using a 2 x 3 x 6 factorial repeated measures ANOVA with the factors imperative 269 
stimulus (Go and NoGo), door width (Narrow, Mid and Wide), time window (600-700 ms, 700-800 ms) and 270 
electrode location (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, POz and Oz). For post-hoc analysis, the data was contrasted using Tukey 271 
HSD. In case of violations of the sphericity, corrected p-values are reported. All ANOVA were computed as 272 
linear mixed models and all p-values for Tukey HSD contrasts were adjusted using Bonferroni method to 273 




Subjective and Behavioral results 278 
 279 
SAM Ratings. A 2 x 3 factorial repeated measures ANOVA with the factors imperative stimulus (Go and 280 
NoGo) and door width (Narrow, Mid and Wide) for each emotional dimension of the SAM questionnaire 281 
revealed differences in the main effect for width: Arousal (F2,4326 = 95.12, p < 0.0001), Dominance (F2,4326 = 282 
46.42, p < 0.0001) and Valence (F2,4326 = 188.65, p < 0.0001). For the imperative stimulus, differences were 283 
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found for Arousal (F2, 4326 = 443.54, p < 0.0001), Dominance (F2, 4326 = 435.49, p < 0.0001), and Valence (F2, 284 
4326 = 446.20, p < 0.0001). Interaction effects revealed significant difference for all interactions (all p < 285 
0.0001). Post-hoc contrasts using Tukey HSD (Figure 3) showed no significant differences for NoGo in 286 
Arousal, however significant differences were identified for Go between Narrow-Mid (p < 0.0001), Narrow-287 
Wide (p < 0.0001) and Mid-Wide (p < 0.0001). For NoGo in Dominance no significant differences were 288 
revealed between Narrow-Mid (p = 0.1376), as opposed to Narrow-Wide (p < 0.0001) and Mid-Wide (p = 289 
0.0334), whereas for Go no significant differences were found for Mid-Wide (p = 0.2199), as opposed to 290 
Narrow-Mid (p < 0.0001) and Narrow-Wide (p < 0.0001). For Valence, significant difference were revealed 291 
for all contrasts for Go, Narrow-Mid (p < 0.0001), Narrow-Wide (p < 0.0001) and Mid-Wide (p < 0.0001). 292 
However, for NoGo significant differences were only identified for Narrow-Mid (p < 0.0001) and Narrow-293 
Wide (p < 0.0001).  294 
 295 
Figure 3 about here 296 
 297 
Performance. To investigate the time it took participants from the Go-stimulus to passing the door, a one-way 298 
ANOVA with repeated measures for different door widths was computed revealing a significant difference for 299 
the factor door widths (F2,36 = 6.404, p = 0.0042; Figure 4). Post-hoc comparison (Tukey test) showed no 300 
significant differences in behavior when approaching the Narrow or Mid wide doors (p > 0.1), a tendency to 301 
be slower when approaching Mid as compared to Wide doors (p < 0.1), and a significant difference between 302 
approaching Narrow as compared to Wide door (p < 0.001) with significantly faster approach times for the 303 
Wide door condition.  304 
 305 
Figure 4 about here 306 
 307 
EEG - Early event-related potentials 308 
 309 
Posterior P1. With onset of the lights that allowed participants to see the room including the door (“Lights 310 
on”), the ERPs demonstrated a clear P1-N1 complex most pronounced over the occipital midline electrode 311 
with a first positive component around 100 ms, followed by a negative peak around 200 ms (Figure 5.1 and 312 
see Figure 5.2 in supplementary materials for full six channels). At the frontal midline electrode, this pattern 313 
was inversed and a negative component around 100 ms was followed by a positive peak observed around 200 314 
ms. The 3 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA on P1 amplitudes for posterior electrodes revealed significant main 315 
effects for both the factors widths (F2,108 = 8.163, p = 0.005) and channel (F2,36 = 15.868, p < 0.0001). The 316 
interaction effect was not significant (F4,108 = 1.669, p = 0.1624). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test 317 
revealed significant differences in peak amplitudes at channel Oz between Narrow and Mid wide transitions 318 
(p = 0.0021) and between Narrow and Wide transitions (p = 0.0065) but no differences between Mid and Wide 319 
transitions (p = 1). Tukey contrasts yielded no significant differences between electrodes, with differences in 320 
P1 amplitudes at POz comparing Narrow and Wide transitions (p = 0.028).  321 
 322 
Figure 5.1 about here 323 
 324 
Posterior N1. The 3 x 3 repeated measure ANOVA on N1 amplitudes for posterior electrodes revealed a 325 
significant main effect for the factor door widths (F2,108 = 4.348, p = 0.0153) and no significant impact for the 326 
factor channels (F2,36 = 0.0893, p = 0.9147), nor the interaction (F4,108 = 1.304, p = 0.2731). Post-hoc Tukey 327 
HSD contrasts revealed no significant differences for Pz and POz. However, similar to posterior P1, significant 328 
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differences at Oz for the comparison of Narrow and Mid wide transitions (p = 0.0113) and for the comparison 329 
of Narrow and Wide transitions (p = 0.0372) were found (Figure 6).  330 
 331 
Figure 6 about here 332 
 333 
Anterior P1. An inverse pattern was observed for amplitudes over anterior leads with a main effect of door 334 
widths that differed depending on the affordances (F2,108 = 11.071, p < 0.0001). The main effect of channels 335 
also reached significance (F2,36 = 5.3627, p = 0.0092). Tukey HSD contrasts revealed significant differences 336 
only between Narrow and Wide transitions for FCz (p = 0.0071) and Cz (p = 0.0214), and a tendency at Fz (p 337 
= 0.0717). The interaction was not significant. 338 
 339 
Anterior N1. The 3 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA on N1 amplitudes for anterior electrodes revealed no 340 
significant main effect for the factor door widths (F2,108 = 1.823, p = 0.1663). In contrast, the main effect of 341 
channels reached significance (F2,108 = 8.109, p = 0.0012). The interaction did not reach significance.  342 
 343 
EEG - Motor-related processes. After onset of the imperative stimulus a positive peak at anterior leads and 344 
a negative peak at posterior leads were observed. For sake of brevity, this potential complex is referred to as 345 
early post imperative complex (EPIC). Reflecting similar cortical polarity as the P1-N1 complex, the EPIC 346 
was analyzed in a similar way, separating anterior leads (Fz, FCz and Cz) from posterior leads (Pz, POz and 347 
Oz), and detecting single peaks in individual averages.  348 
 349 
Anterior EPIC. A 2 x 3 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant difference in the main effect for 350 
widths (F2,270 = 4.21, p = 0.0157), imperative stimulus (F1,270 = 23.66, p < 0.0001), and for channel (F2,36 = 351 
6.70, p = 0.0033). No interaction effect was observed. The Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc Tukey HSD revealed 352 
no significant differences between the transition widths for different channels or imperative stimuli. 353 
   354 
Posterior EPIC. The identical ANOVA for the posterior potentials of the EPIC revealed no significant impact 355 
of transition widths (F2,270 = 2.001, p = 0.1371) nor imperative stimulus (F1,270 = 2.30, p = 0.1298). Significant 356 
differences in EPIC amplitude were observed for the factor channel (F2,36 = 5.45, p = 0.0085). Since 357 
topographical differences were not in the focus of this study, no further post-hoc contrasts were computed. No 358 
interaction was significant.  359 
 360 
PINV. In the preparation time prior to the onset of the door color change, indicating either to walk through the 361 
door or to remain in the same room, we observed no systematic negative going waveform as reported in 362 
previous studies (37, 49). However, after onset of the color change, a pronounced positivity, followed by a 363 
long-lasting negative waveform over fronto-central locations was observed in the ERP (Figure 7.1 and see 364 
Figure 7.2 in supplementary material for full six channels). This negative waveform resembled a post-365 
imperative negative variation (PINV) as described in previous studies (40, 42, 50). The PINV component was 366 
observed 600-800 ms post imperative stimulus (color change of the door) and varied as a function of the 367 
affordance of the environment (door width). A global 2 x 3 x 6 factorial repeated measures ANOVA was 368 
computed to analyze the MRCPs using Go/NoGo, Width and Electrode as repeated measures. The ANOVA 369 
revealed significant differences in the main effect for Go/NoGo (F1,540 = 19.54, p < 0.0001) and for Electrode 370 
(F5,90 = 16.69, p < 0.0001). Significant differences were reported for the interaction effect of 371 
Go/NoGo:Channel (F5,540 = 5.25, p = 0.0001) and for Width:Channel (F10,540 = 2.61, p = 0.0042).  372 
 373 
Figure 7.1 about here 374 
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Post-hoc contrasts, using Tukey HSD, revealed significant differences only for the Go condition, as opposed 376 
to the NoGo condition (Figure 8.1). Similar to the early evoked potentials, differences were only observed in 377 
frontal and occipital sites and between Narrow and Mid door widths over FCz (p = 0.0059) and Oz (p < 378 
0.0001), as well as between Narrow and Wide doors at FCz (p = 0.0323) and Oz (p < 0.0001). No differences 379 
were observed between the Mid and Wide doors (Figure 8.2 in the supplementary material for all six channels). 380 
 381 
Figure 8.1 about here 382 
 383 
DISCUSSION 384 
The main goal of this study was to assess whether brain activity is altered depending on the affordances offered 385 
by the environment. If such an account holds true, affordances should systematically modulate behavior and 386 
brain activity. Specifically, we hypothesized that perceptual processes co-vary with the environmental 387 
affordances leading to behavioral changes and that motor-related cortical potentials would vary as a function 388 
of affordances. 389 
  390 
SAM and approach time. The results of the questionnaire should be interpreted with caution due to the 391 
amount of trials per participant, the varying sensitivity to VR and the different skills of subjective emotional 392 
evaluation. The analysis of subjective ratings revealed significant differences between different Go trials, but 393 
no differences for NoGo trials regarding Arousal ratings. When given a NoGo, participants responded 394 
perhaps arbitrarily, feeling unburdened, causing no significant difference among the three door widths. 395 
Notably, in cases of NoGo, all participants perceived a similar scene standing in front of a red (NoGo) door, 396 
turning around and answering the virtual SAM. The only variable in this sense was the door width, while the 397 
only difference from NoGo to Go, was the action itself. The subjective ratings highlight the influence of 398 
action on evaluating the environment. If space was to be investigated statically (comparable to the case of 399 
NoGo), we would not have been able to detect any differences for Arousal for varying door sizes, potentially 400 
due to the absence of action. Varying door sizes for Go trials yielded differences between passable and 401 
impassable conditions for Dominance, reporting that Narrow door was more dominating than Mid and Wide. 402 
However, for Valence we observed an increasing score the narrower the door, which is the opposite behavior 403 
observed for Arousal. These results indicate that being able to pass easily is more exciting, less pleasant and 404 
less dominating. This effect is perhaps grounded in the monetary reward participants could receive only 405 
when successfully passing through to the next room. Most importantly, however, the findings indicate that 406 
subjective reports differ significantly dependent on whether participants actively moved through the rooms 407 
or not implying an impact of action affective ratings of an environment. We speculate whether the 408 
omnipresent significant differences may be rooted in uniqueness of emotional states that varies from 409 
participant to participant. Such an account of emotional ratings is currently gaining credibility (51, 52). 410 
 411 
The time it took participants to reach the door after onset of the imperative color change varied according to 412 
the environmental affordance. Participants approached the Wide door significantly faster than Mid and Narrow 413 
doors, while there was no significant difference for Mid and Narrow transitions. While the Wide door clearly 414 
offered a passage without greater computational demands regarding the motor plan and execution, the Mid 415 
door width, being ambiguously wide/narrow, might have triggered motor processes simulating a transition to 416 
estimate whether the door was passable or not. In this sense, the Mid and Narrow doors, causing uncertainty, 417 
might have delayed approach times due to increasing processing demands. Admittedly, results derived from 418 
the approach time are limited, partly due to the caused fatigue of operating a physically demanding task for a 419 
relatively long time period, and partly due to the subjective manner and interpretation of passing a door that is 420 
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seemingly impossible to pass. This caused participants to develop different approach strategies which caused 421 
different delays. However, the fact that participants, in general, spent significantly more time approaching the 422 
Narrow doors compared to Wide doors provides sufficient guidance for the analyses of cortical measures 423 
associated with these differences.  424 
 425 
Cortical measures  426 
 427 
Early evoked potentials . As an initial insight into the association of affordances and cortical potentials, we 428 
analyzed the early visual-evoked potentials. We expected to find differences in the stimulus-locked ERP at 429 
occipital channels reflecting differences in sensory processing of affordance-related aspects of the transition. 430 
Importantly, based on the assumption of fast sensorimotor active inferences that should be reflected in 431 
action-directed stimulus processing influencing not only sensory but also motor-related activity, we 432 
hypothesized to also find differences in the ERP over motor areas in the same time window as sensory 433 
potentials (i.e., between 50 and 200 ms). As illustrated in the analysis, we found significant differences in 434 
amplitudes of the visually evoked P1 component over the central occipital electrode dependent on the 435 
affordance of the transition. In addition, in line with our hypothesis, we also found a difference over fronto-436 
central leads starting around 50 ms and lasting until 200 ms after onset of the doors display. Taken together, 437 
no significant differences in peak amplitudes were found when comparing the passable Mid and Wide doors 438 
while peak amplitude associated with both door widths significantly differed from impassable Narrow doors. 439 
Note that the visual scene of the three doors are comparable as they contained same physical contrasts, and 440 
that participants at this point did not know whether to go or not as they were merely introduced to the setting 441 
they might have to pass in a couple of seconds. As no significant differences were found for NoGo, it 442 
functions as a matching control, and thus we can interpret the differences in Go as affordance manipulation. 443 
These results indicate that impassable doors with poor affordances produce significantly different early 444 
evoked potentials compared to passable doors particularly at fronto-central and occipital sites. Thus, 445 
environmental affordances, in terms of being able to program bodily trajectory to transit spaces, yield a 446 
significant measurable effect on early cortical potentials best pronounced over frontal and occipital sites at 447 
approximately 200ms after first view of the environment.   448 
 449 
Considering the affordance-specific pattern observed for the early P1-N1-complex, prior studies have shown 450 
this visual evoked potential complex to reflect attentional processes associated with spatial or feature-based 451 
aspects of stimuli (53–57). Attended stimuli elicit larger P1-N1 amplitudes than unattended ones. Based on 452 
these findings, the results suggest that passable transitions were associated with increased attentional 453 
processing. Approaching the affordance-specific pattern of P1-N1-complex using active inferences (58), the 454 
difference confirms the assumption that perceptual processes co-vary with environmental affordances. In this 455 
sense, the amplitude difference might be credited to the process of active inference of whether the body can 456 
actively move and transit at all. This implies that visual attention is also guided by action-related properties of 457 
the environment and support the concept of fast, lower sensorimotor active inferences, explained as 458 
hierarchical and dynamic model of the world. Similar to HAC (31) and active inference (30, 59), these findings 459 
are in line with parallel cortical processes integrating sensory information to specify currently available 460 
affordances. Similarly, this means that, how one might act upon the environment is an ongoing process of 461 
affordances, taking place as early as perceptual processes, and which situates actions in an intimate position 462 
with perception. Such early processes are deeply involved in the impression of the environment for an agent 463 
pointing towards the importance of movement in cognition, and of how an agent enacts the world. Given 464 
affordances are processed at such an early stage, we speculate whether the impression of an environment 465 
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compose the immediate experience of the environment in a particular setting. Such an immediate experience 466 
fits with the term atmospheres as defined by Zumthor (60) “I enter a building, see a room, and – in a fraction 467 
of a second – have this feeling about it”, and thus relating the instantaneous emerging experience of space to 468 
affordances and action in general.  469 
 470 
Motor-related potentials. Although the ERP plots indicate an affordance-trend of the EPIC, statistical tests 471 
revealed no significant differences. However, Narrow door width elicited the greatest amplitude, both in case 472 
of anterior positivity and posterior negativity. In line with prediction errors and affordances, the increased 473 
amplitude associated with Narrow transitions can be interpret as a reflection of the body simply not fitting, 474 
and yet forced to interact with the transition. Recall that prior to the imperative stimulus, participants have 475 
been standing for 6 s (σ = 1 s). The EPIC may have an influence on the PINV. The nature of the PINV 476 
component is not as well investigated as other ERP components, limiting the reliability of an interpretation 477 
based on only a few studies that treat the component as modality-unspecific, and rather “consider the PINV 478 
as an electrocortical correlate of a cognitive state” (61). Since the study by Gauthier and Gottesmann (62) 479 
the PINV, similar to affordances, has been hypothesized to act as a marker of change in psychophysiological 480 
state. Ever since, the PINV has been used to investigate depression, schizophrenia, learned helplessness and 481 
loss of control (40–42, 63, 64). Results show depressive and schizophrenic participants to exhibit an 482 
increased PINV that is explained as increased vulnerability for loss of control, as well as increased 483 
anticipation for future affective events (40, 42, 50). If an increased PINV reflects increased vulnerability for 484 
future events, as we observed for impassable doors, then the component, constituted by continuous motor 485 
potential activity, sheds new light on affordances as an intrinsic affective property of action itself. Casement 486 
and colleagues (42) even suggested the PINV to depend on lack of control as the state of having no 487 
influence; depriving the potential to act. This could explain the difference in the Narrow condition, as 488 
participants were instructed to attempt to pass at all times until failure leading to a sense of loss of control.  489 
Only in cases of Go did we observe a difference in the PINV component, which varied similar to the P1-N1-490 
complex. Amplitudes of the component for Narrow doors were significantly different from Mid and Wide 491 
doors, while the passable conditions did not differ from one another. Further, there were no significant 492 
differences in the PINV component in cases of NoGo, emphasizing the importance of the motor execution 493 
itself to evoke the PINV component. These results point towards the PINV component as an expression of 494 
willingness to execute an act restricted beyond ones’ own control, i.e. a designed environment. Thus, the PINV 495 
might serve as an excellent marker for affordances.  496 
The presented results of the PINV are consistent with the observed increase in activity over fronto-central sites 497 
by Bozzacchi et al. (39). Bozzacchi and colleagues concluded that the meaning of the action and awareness of 498 
being able to act – affordances – affect action preparation, which is here understood as the motor-related 499 
potential prior to movement onset. We argue that the PINV component might reflect a willingness, or even 500 
intentional, aspect of affordances. This would mean that the PINV is not modulated by the perception (that the 501 
door is a different visual information), but reveals something about the intention of movement – which we 502 
translate to affordances. For this reason, we find significant differences in cases of Go, but not in NoGo, and 503 
further for passable compared to impassable. In light of HAC (31), a potential explanation for the absence of 504 
differences in the NoGo trials, is related to the immediate action selection, which in all cases (Narrow, Mid 505 
and Wide) is a simple turn to answer the questionnaire, and thus present the participant with identical 506 
affordances. When instead given a Go, cortical processes require an action selection related to the anticipated 507 
motor trajectory, which differs according to the affordances of the door width. Regarding the temporal aspect 508 
of transitioning to the next room, HAC suggests the higher levels bias the lower level competitions, which 509 
operate at the level of action itself, through a cascade of expected next affordances. The lower levels have a 510 
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continuous competition of how to satisfy the higher expectations. Action selection, executed while unfolding 511 
the planned movements in a continuous manner, depend on the expectation of next affordances. Taken 512 
together, the post-hoc analyses revealed differences grouped for passable as compared to impassable doors 513 
throughout all channels, except for Pz. We do not observe any differences between Mid-Wide, but find 514 
significant differences between Narrow-Mid and Narrow-Wide. The greatest differences were found over 515 
fronto-central and occipital sites. Similar to the early evoked potentials, these results indicate that 516 
environmental affordances impact neural activity prior to action depending on whether one has to act or not.  517 
 518 
Notably, regarding architectural experience, since the PINV component was only expressed in the Go 519 
condition (forced interaction with the environment), these findings support the importance of movement for 520 
architectural experience, in a sense that action or even only the perception of action possibilities alters brain 521 
activity. Visually guiding and propelling the body in space greatly influences the continuous emerging of 522 
affordances, which in turn affect the human experience. We found differences in fronto-central and occipital 523 
areas, prior to movement through space with the  post-imperative negative going waveform most pronounced 524 
over FCz indicated an involvement of the supplementary motor area (SMA) as reported by Bozzacchi et al. 525 
(39). Interestingly, earlier studies showed involvement of SMA in visually guided actions (65), which is the 526 
essence of active inferences. The PINV can be generated independently from the re-afferent signal, which is, 527 
in terms of active inference, understood as ascending (bottom-up) proprioceptive prediction-errors (66). This 528 
suggests the PINV component might reflect descending (top-down) predictions, rendering SMA as an essential 529 
area of action-perception loop, and thus crucial for processing continuous affordances. This account might 530 
resolve the finding of fronto-central differences in Go trials only. The SMA is anatomically bridging the frontal 531 
cortex with motor cortex – perhaps also functionally as argued by Adams et al. (66), as this anatomical nature 532 
fits with the proposed hierarchical characteristics of forward and backward projections in active inferences.   533 
 534 
CONCLUSION 535 
The present study provides strong evidence for affordances to be processed as early as perceptual processes, 536 
linking action and perception in a similar manner to active inference. The results points towards a conception 537 
of the brain that seems to deal with “how can I act” while in parallel processes referring to “what do I perceive” 538 
take place. The results thus support the assumption that perception of the environment is influenced by 539 
affordances and action itself – hence, affordances and action can influence experience of an environment. Due 540 
to the importance of affordances and action for brain dynamics, this further emphasizes and qualifies the 541 
general idea of enactivism as a holistic approach to investigate cognition. We do not claim that architectural 542 
affordances are directly represented as a specific event-related potential component; however, we provide 543 
evidence for an action-perception account of cognition, which systematically differentiates according to the 544 
definition of affordances. 545 
The nature of the analyzed brain activity emphasizes the importance of the intentional movement. Our results 546 
are consistent with the concept of continuous affordances as explained by active inferences. In terms of 547 
architecture, the results shed light on why transitions have been a constant throughout the history of 548 
architecture, perhaps especially in religious and other buildings that actively aimed at producing a certain 549 
experience of presence. Thus, the fact that we are predictive beings, in terms of architecture, means we should 550 
take into consideration how bodily movement alters perception. By altering perception, this would ultimately 551 
lead spaces to have a potentially physiological impact on users. Much remains to be uncovered in architectural 552 
cognition. Moving and transitioning in space, is continuously constructing a prediction of a world, a world that 553 
we perceive dependent on our action potentials, which informs brain, body and mind. Transitions in 554 
architecture form a holistic entity of architectural experience expressed as the unfolding of motor planning, 555 
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spatial sequences and predictive mechanisms. Similar to Zeki (67), we speculate whether the ancient interest 556 
in tailoring transitions and sequences may have developed as a trial-and-error of active-narration, perhaps 557 
rooted in ancient knowledge of the predictive mind and action-perception parallel processing nature of the 558 
human being.  559 
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Figure legends 794 
 795 
Figure 1 796 
Fig. 1 – (A) Participants were instructed to stand in the start-square. A black sphere would restrict their vision to pure black for 3 797 
seconds, σ = 1. The moment the black sphere disappears, participants perceive the door they have to pass. They wait for the 798 
imperative stimulus, either a green door (Go) or a red door (NoGo), for 6 seconds, σ = 1. In case of Go, participants were instructed 799 
to pass the opening, virtually touch the red circle, which in turn would release a monetary bonus, return to start square and answer the 800 
virtual SAM questionnaire. In case of NoGo, participants were instructed to turn around and answer the virtual SAM. (B) The three 801 
different doors were dimensioned as following Narrow 0.2 meter, Mid 1 meter and Wide 1.5 meters. Note the color code for each 802 
door as they are used throughout the paper. (C) The diagrammatic timeline depicts a the sequences of events for a single trial in 803 
conceptual manner. 804 
 805 
Figure 2 806 
Fig. 2 – Mobile Brain/Body Imaging setup. The participants wore a backpack, carrying a high-performance gaming computer (Zotac, 807 
Cyan color), powered by two batteries (Red color). An EEG amplifier (ANT eegoSports, Yellow color) was attached to the backpack 808 
and connected to the computer. The participants wore a VR head mounted display (Windows mixed reality) on top of a 64 channel 809 
cap. This setup allowed participants to freely move around while recording data.  810 
 811 
Figure 3 812 
Fig. 3 – Box plot of the SAM questionnaire results for the three different SAM scales (arousal, dominance, and valence) as a 813 
function of the door width (Narrow, Mid, Wide). The left column displays the pictorial representation of the SAM manikin for the 814 
highest value of each condition presented. The middle column displays the SAM ratings for the Go condition. The right column 815 
displays the SAM ratings for the NoGo-condition. Means are indicated by dashed line, while medians are solid line. Adjusted p 816 
values are reported. 817 
 818 
Figure 4 819 
Fig. 4 – Rain-cloud plot of approach times for each door width condition. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey test are displayed with 820 
a dot < 0.1 and * < 0.05 and *** < 0.001. Means are indicated by dashed line, while medians are displayed as solid lines.  821 
 822 
Figure 5.1 823 
Fig. 5.1 – Three time-locked ERPs (FCz, Pz and Oz) at the onset of “Lights On” event. Narrow condition in yellow, Mid condition in 824 
blue and Wide condition in red. Two time windows are indicated with dashed-lines and grey transparent box. The first time window 825 
(50 – 200 ms) mark the anterior N1 and posterior P1, while the second window (140 – 290 ms) mark the anterior P1 and posterior 826 
N1. The components are marked with arrows.  827 
 828 
Figure 6 829 
Fig. 6 – Posterior P1. Rain-cloud plot of detected mean amplitude of positive peak in time-locked event “Lights on” in the time 830 
range of 50 to 200 ms for Pz, POz and Oz. Means are indicated by dashed line, while medians are solid line. Significance is 831 
calculated using Tukey HSD. We observed significant differences for Oz between Narrow-Mid (p = 0.0021) and Narrow-Wide (p = 832 
0.0065), while for POz in Narrow-Wide revealed significant difference (p = 0.028), however no significant differences were 833 
observed in other electrodes and other contrasts. Posterior N1. Rain-cloud plot of detected mean amplitude of negative peak in time-834 
locked event “Lights on” in the time range of 140 to 290 ms for Pz, POz and Oz. We observed significant differences only for Oz in 835 
Narrow-Mid (p = 0.0113) and Narrow-Wide (p = 0.0372).  Anterior N1. Rain-cloud plot of detected mean amplitude of negative 836 
peak in time-locked event “Lights on” in the time range of 50 to 200 ms for Fz, FCz and Cz We observed no significant differences 837 
for any electrode. Anterior P1. Rain-cloud plot of detected mean amplitude of negative peak in time-locked event “Lights on” in the 838 
time range of 140 to 290 ms for Fz, FCz and Cz We observed significant differences in all electrodes in Narrow-Wide, with the 839 
exception of only a tendency in Fz (p = 0.0717), FCz (p = 0.0071) and Cz (p = 0.0214). Double plot. Frontal (dashed-line) and 840 
posterior (solid-line) time-locked ERPs (Fz and Oz) at the onset of “Lights On” event. Narrow condition in yellow, Mid condition in 841 
blue and Wide condition in red. Two time windows are indicated with dashed-lines and grey transparent box. The first time window 842 
(50 – 200 ms) mark the anterior N1 and posterior P1, while the second window (140 – 290 ms) mark the anterior P1 and posterior 843 
N1. 844 
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Fig. 7 – Three time-locked ERPs (FCz, Pz and Oz) at the onset of Go/NoGo. Narrow condition in yellow, Mid condition in blue and 847 
Wide condition in red. The time window, indicated with dashed-lines and grey transparent box, illustrates the selected time window 848 
to analyze the MRCP by a global 2 x 3 x 6 factorial repeated measures ANOVA. Anterior and posterior PINV are marked with 849 
arrows. 850 
 851 
Figure 8.1 852 
Fig. 8.1 – Rain-cloud plots of mean amplitude of negative development in time-locked event of Go/NoGo in the time range of 600 to 853 
800 ms for FCz, Pz and Oz. Means are indicated by dashed line, while medians are solid line. The Tukey HSD contrast revealed 854 
differences only in FCz and Oz, and between Narrow-Mid for FCz (p = 0.0059) and for Oz (p < 0.0001), and between Narrow-Wide 855 
for FCz (p = 0.0323) and for Oz (p < 0.0001). No differences were observed for NoGo.  856 
 857 
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Supplementary figure legends 860 
 861 
Figure 5.2 – supplementary  862 
Fig. 5.2 – ERP plots of “Lights On” stimulus for all six channels (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, POz and Oz). Narrow condition in yellow, Mid 863 
condition in blue and Wide condition in red. N1-P1-complex are marked with arrows. 864 
 865 
Figure 7.2 - supplementary  866 
Fig. 10 – ERP plots of the total six channels only for Go trials. ANOVA with repeated measures of time-locked ERP, where the 867 
increasing darkness behind the plots indicates the increasing level of significance. The repeated measures ANOVA revealed Fz (F2,36 868 
= 4.546, p = 0.0174), FCz (F2,36 = 7.116, p = 0.0025), Cz (F2,36 = 4.116, p = 0.0236), Pz (F2,36 = 0.089, p = 0.915), POz (F2,36 = 869 
1.708, p = 0.196) and Oz (F2,36 = 14.39, p < 0.0001). We observed no difference for NoGo – however, we observed a difference 870 
within frontocentral and occipital sites for Go trials.  871 
 872 
Figure 8.2 – supplementary 873 
Fig. 11 – Rain-cloud plot of the mean amplitude of selected six channels between 600 – 800 ms post imperative stimulus – PINV 874 
component. Means are indicated by dashed line, while medians are solid line. We compared (Tukey test) the Width within Go and 875 
NoGo conditions, and observed only significant differences for Go condition. We observed differences within frontocentral and 876 
occipital sites.   877 
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